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The legal and political systems of the Kingdom of Jordan
are  predicated  upon  two  sources  of  legitimacy,
sovereignty,  and authority. One is the head of state, the
Hashemite monarch; the other is the people, whose power
is  delegated  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Hence
Jordanian governments have been accountable to both.
This  duality has created a precarious equilibrium, which
at  times  has  contributed   to  political  instability.  On  the
whole,  the domestic political history of Jordan over the
last five decades, has largely been  a constant struggle
between  the  two  components  of  sovereignty.  The
Hashemite  establishment,  on  the  one  hand,  has  taken
pains  to  maintain  Jordan  as  a  centralized  state,  to
preserve its own power, and to hold on to  the lion’s share
of the source of authority. The public, on the other hand,
by  means  of  parliamentary  and  extra-parliamentary
activities,  has  endeavored  to  increase  democratization
and political liberalization, to gain more civil liberties and
to be given a greater say in the decision-making process.
Until the late 1980s, this struggle  was an asymmetric one
between unequal forces. The monarchy took advantage of
its position  to reduce to a minimum the civil activity the
people were clamoring for and it did so under the pretext
of security reasons and concern for public order.  In 1957,
following an attempted coup d’etat,  all the political parties
were outlawed and  martial law was proclaimed1.  
Throughout  the  long  years  of  his  reign,  the  late  King
Hussein managed by and large to secure the obedience
1   The latter measure was lifted a year later, but  Jordan remained, on and off, in a state of  
emergency  until the early 1990s.
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and  cooperation  of  successive  parliaments.  Both  the
constitution  and the  accepted political  practice  provided
the king with the tools to bypass the legislative authority or
simply to ignore it. In the first place, new laws had to be
endorsed  by  both  houses,  namely,   the  Chamber  of
Deputies and the Senate. The members of the latter were
nominated by the king. In this way the Senate helped him
block any undesirable legislation initiatives that came from
the  Chamber.  Moreover,  when  parliament  was  not  in
session (sometimes for  up  to  eight  months  a year)  the
government  could  pass  ‘temporary  laws’,  an  extremely
useful  procedure  for  the  executive  (see  below).   Such
edicts  were  later  debated  by  the  parliament,  when
reconvened,  and some of them were rejected.  
Finally, to cap it all: between 1967 and 1989 no general
elections  were  held  in  Jordan.  The  composition  of  the
Chamber of Deputies reflected the unity of Jordan’s East
and  West  Banks  and  consisted  of  30  West  Bank
Palestinians as well as 30 East Bankers. Since Jordan lost
the West Bank to Israel in June 1967 no new elections
were held as half of the Jordanian constituency was now
under Israeli occupation. The parliament nevertheless did
function part of the time. Deputies who preferred to stay in
the West Bank or others who died were replaced either by
election  among  Palestinians  in  the  East  Bank  or  by
provisional  nomination.  Only  in  1989,  following  King
Hussein’s decision to abandon  Jordan’s claim to the West
Bank and to sever Jordan’s legal ties with it, a new 80-
member Chamber  of Deputies was elected, in the East
Bank only. 
The dissociation from the West Bank coincided with,  or
even  somewhat  affected,  an  incipient  democratization
process. 
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Following civil disturbances  and riots in southern Jordan
in April  1989 in protest against unemployment and price
rises of fuel and basic food products,  the king, in order to
meet  the  protesters’  demands,   undertook  to  introduce
certain economic reforms. The agitation for reform soon
went beyond the economic realm.  Within a few months
Jordan  was  in  the  midst  of  a  democratization  process,
whose political reforms highlighted freedom of expression
and the holding of free and democratic general elections.
In  the  next  eight  years  three  election  campaigns  took
place and three chambers  of  deputies  were  elected:  in
1989, 1993 and 1997.
This process seemed irreversible. Emergency laws were
abolished, the ban on political parties was removed, and
personal freedom was  increased. 
All  these contributed to strengthening the emerging civil
society  in  Jordan.   Political  and  social  forces  became
openly  critical  of   the  government,  and  demanded
additional and more intensive reforms as well as changes
in Jordan’s regional and foreign policy.   Leading among
these  were  various  Islamic  organizations,  Pan-Arab
groups,  and  left-wing  activists.  They  became  well
organized and expressed their views by parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary avenues. The foremost group was the
union  of professional associations. This was a coalition
120,000 strong of 14 professional associations (engineers,
doctors, lawyers, journalists and the likes) that formed the
backbone of the nascent civil society. These associations
– most of them led by Islamic  or left-wing activists, soon
dominated the Jordanian public discourse, and, to a larger
extent dictated its agenda.     
It  seems  that  even  the  most   radical  opposition  forces
never intended  to topple  the monarchy, at least not at
that   stage.  They  were  well  aware  that  the  Hashemite
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crown was the one  unifying factor for the various  strands
that make up the fabric of Jordanian society and for the
delicate  and  precarious  relations  and  boundaries  that
define  it,  such  as   Jordanian/  Palestinian,   traditional/
modern,  rich/  poor,  etc.   Agreeing  that  without  the
monarchy  the  state  might  well  slide into  an anarchy or
possibly  even  disintegrate,   they  strove  to  make  the
regime more receptive to  their views rather than replace
it,   and  to  increase  their  share  in  the  decision  making
process. 
Their major demands concerned foreign policy,  first  and
foremost,  Jordan’s  attitude  to  Israel.  Those  forces
opposed any ties with Israel insisted that the government
reconsider  its  peace  treaty  with  the  Jewish  state  and
conducted  a  continuous  nationwide  campaign  against
normalization of relations with Israel. 
Obviously these forces were the most sympathetic to the
Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip,
especially  after  the outbreak  of  the   Al-Aqsa Intifada in
October 2000. They also opposed the US,  particularly its
Middle  Eastern   policy.  They  urged   the  Jordanian
government to disregard the sanctions against Iraq, and
after September 11 condemned the US led  campaign in
Afghanistan.       
These  developments  placed the  regime before  a  grave
dilemma: how to ensure the central role of the Hashemite
crown  while  simultaneously  continuing  democratization.
How problematic  democratization  could  be came to  the
fore  as early as in 1989, when the  free general election
yielded  a  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  which  Islamist
candidates gained 34 (42%) of the 80 parliamentary seats.
The leftists won 13 seats. In other words, more than 50%
of the deputies had oppositional leanings, a situation that
created frequent difficulties for the government. 
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The landslide victory  of  the  Islamists  in  these elections
caused  the government in 1992 to enact a new election
law, commonly known as the ‘one man one vote’ law. It
allowed  a  voter  to  elect  only  one  candidate  in  each
election district, even if that district was allotted three or
four seats in the Chamber of Deputies. (According to the
old law each voter allowed to elect as many candidates as
its  district  was  allotted.)      As  most  of  the  Jordanian
constituencies voted according to traditional pattern, many
people would vote first for the tribal or the extended family
candidate  and  only  then  for  candidates  they  politically
supported (in many cases the Islamist  candidates).  The
new law indeed weakened the power of the Islamists, who
in the 1993 elections won about 14 seats less than in  the
previous elections.  When this law was not substantially
revised prior  to the next elections in 1997,  the leading
Islamic  party,  the  Islamic  Action  Front  (IAF),  boycotted
them so that  altogether only seven Islamists sat in the
new Chamber of Deputies. 
The ‘one man one vote’ law became the core of a heated
debate between government and opposition and one of
the  main  factors  for  the  slowing  down  of  the
democratization process. On the one hand the Hashemite
establishment was afraid that if the new law was abolished
the Islamists and other opposition groups would win an
overwhelming electoral  victory and might gain control  of
the Chamber of Deputies. On the other hand there was a
fear that unlimited freedom of expression could cause the
media  to  cross  all  red  lines  and  Jordan  might  soon
deteriorate to anarchy. Hence, in 1993 a new Press and
Publication  law  was  introduced  that  imposed  explicit
restrictions on the Press with penalties for their violation.
According to this law (article 40) journals and periodicals
were prohibited, inter alia, to publish news which offended
the king  or  the  royal  family;  unsanctioned news on the
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Jordanian armed forces; material expressing contempt for
religion; articles that damaged national unity etc.2  
Anti-government elements for their part claimed that the
peace  with  Israel  was  the  main  obstacle  on  the
democratization path. Displays of the all-out opposition to
peace and normalization were quelled by the government
which  resorted  to  non-democratic  methods  for  this
purpose.  
  
 When  the  present  King  Abdallah  came  to  power   in
February  1999  he  had  to  cope  with  his  father’s
inheritance.  Besides  the  enormous  economic  problems
and  the  tension  between citizens  of   Jordanian  and  of
Palestinian origin, a most serious challenge was how to
maintain  the  balance  between  democracy  and  regime
survival.  How far  could  Abdallah  go  in  maintaining  civil
liberties and free elections without imperiling the dominant
position of the Hashemite throne.  That is  how to have his
cake and eat it . 
On the face of it at least,  in his first year and a half on the
throne Abdallah showed open mindedness and a liberal
attitude.  His  government  opened  a  dialogue  with  the
opposition  over  the   controversial  Election  and  Press
laws3. 
2 This law was amended in 1997 and included additional prohibitions (such as distributing
false information or rumors damaging public interest).  As the government failed to secure its
survival  by  limiting  the  oppositional  voice  in  the  press,  it  proposed  in  1998  a   more
comprehensive and  draconic version of the Press and Publication Law which threatened
violaters with severe punishments.  A former Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri, described it as the
‘coup de grace to public liberties’.  The Jordan Times 7 Sept.  1999. See also:  Russell  E.
Lucas, Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: Collective Action and Path Dependence in
Jordan Unpublished PhD dissertation,  Georgetown University,  Washington DC, 2000,  pp.
121-124; 158, 164, 202; Tareq Y. Ismael  Middle East Politics Today: Government and Civil
Society (University Press of Florida, 2001), pp. 83-86.  
3 In  September  1999  the  government  introduced  a  ’softened’  version  of  the  Press  and
Publication Law to the National Assembly, which  amended it even further.  The debate over
the election law  in fact  continued till 2002 (see below).  
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Still,  the  tightrope  King  Abdallah  was  walking  became
even more slippery in the last two years, after the outbreak
of  the  ‘Al-Aqsa  Intifada’  and  the  attacks  on  the  World
Trade  Center  and   the  Pentagon   on   September  11,
2001.
The  regime’s   ‘traditional’  apprehension  of  the
strengthening of  the  parliamentary  opposition and of  its
exploitation of  freedom of expression (which led to the
enactment of the aforementioned laws) was exacerbated
by  the  Intifada.  On  the  one  hand,  more  than  half  of
Jordan’s population are of Palestinian origin; on the other
hand, the main oppositional forces, the Islamists and the
professional  associations,  were  the  bearers  of  the  anti-
Israeli  banner.  They  fought  relentlessly  against  political
ties  and  normalization  with  Israel  and  unequivocally
supported the Palestinian struggle against it.    
Accordingly,  the  government  correctly  envisaged
demonstrations of support for the Palestinians and acts of
protest  against  Israel  as  well  as   against   Jordan’s
diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. 
Demonstrations  and  public  rallies  in  support  of  the
Palestinians as well as virulent  anti-Israeli  speeches and
press  articles,  created  a  militant  atmosphere  that
appeared to pose a genuine threat to stability and public
order. 
 In June 2001 King Abdallah issued a decree to dissolve
the Parliament. Ostensibly it was a legal procedure within
the  spirit  of  the  constitution,  provided that   the  general
parliamentary elections (due  in November) were held on
time.   Simultaneously   however  the  king  asked  the
government to table a new election law within a month.
The king’s step served a twofold purpose: he created the
impression that he might meet the opposition demand to
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amend the current election law and he won an extension
for  the period that  the government  could  rule  without  a
parliament  and thus pass as many temporary laws as it
wished.  In  July  the  government  endorsed  the  new
(temporary)  election  law  which  met  some  of  the
opposition’s marginal demands. It increased the number of
deputies from 80 to 104, re-drew constituency boundaries,
and stipulated new voting procedures. But it ignored the
opposition’s major demand, the amendment the ’one-man
one-vote’ clause. Obviously the law was  censured by the
opposition  parties  on  the  grounds  that  it   was
unconstitutional. They even brought the issue to Jordan’s
high court.
As  the  first  anniversary  of  the  Intifada  approached  the
government, fearing  a new wave of protests,  passed, in
late  August,  a  new  (temporary)  law  that  limited
demonstrations,  public  gatherings  and  rallies.  This  law
according  to  some  observers  ‘tightened  the  screw  on
public gatherings’. 
In  early  September  tension  between  the  government,
which ruled with practically no checks or  balances,  and
the opposition reached a record high.  Two days prior to
September  11,  the  journalist  Osama  el-Sherif  depicted
those events as ‘the taming of democracy’. He criticized
what he called the ‘draconian measures’ and warned that
‘the holy union between people and government, in paving
a way forward together, may be broken...[t]here is a sense
of polarization going on: Those who are with us vs. those
who are against us’. 
The impact of the events of September 11 on Jordan was
as traumatic as  elsewhere. Yet its being a pro-Western
Arab-Muslim  country  with  strong  religious  influence  of
oppositional inclination, added to those events and to the
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ensuing   American  reaction,   an  additional,  domestic,
dimension. 
The  entire  political  spectrum  denounced  the  attacks
completely.  A few regarded it as an Israeli-American plot
to damage  Islam and the Arabs. Others  accused Israel
and the US of taking advantage of the ‘incident’  to tarnish
the Muslims as terrorists. 
In late September the Islamic Scholars’ Committee of the
IAF  issued  a  fatwa  (formal  legal  opinion)  prohibiting
cooperation  with  the  United  States  in  any  aggression
against  any  Islamic  country.  Such  cooperation  was
regarded  as  ‘sacrilege’  and  treason  against  ‘God,  his
prophet and all Muslims’.
The government  endeavoured to  take advantage of  the
general  shock  caused  by  the  events  in  New  York  and
Washington in order to defuse the political tension or at
least  to  obtain  a  temporary  truce  with  the  opposition,
according to the government’s rules.   
Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Raghib held a series of meetings
with  many  representatives  from  civil  institutions  in  the
country  (leaders  of  political  parties,  members  of  the
Senate, leading journalists and presidents of professional
associations). His message was short and clear: Jordan
was undergoing difficult  times and there was a need to
maintain  security  and  stability.  ‘We are  facing  a  critical
situation  and there  should  be no trouble,  otherwise  the
government will be forced to take tough measures’.
While  his  interlocutors  appreciated  the  government’s
initiative to start a dialogue  with the makers and shakers
of Jordan’s public opinion, they suspected it of aiming to
impose more restrictions on freedom of  expression and
freedom  of  assembly.   They  criticized  US  intentions
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towards  Afghanistan  and rejected    the possibility  that
‘...the  Jordanian people  might  lose  the  right  to  express
themselves and take a stand’. 
Nevertheless  the  government’s  support  of  American
moves  to  ‘fight  terrorism’ was  devoid  of  practically  any
public blessing and backing.  This was unlike the case  in
1990-1991,  when Jordan chose to stand by Iraq against
the  international  coalition  so  the  government  and  the
people were in the same camp. Now, renewal of regime-
opposition tension seemed only a matter of time and those
who expected a severe government response to any show
of public defiance, did not have long to wait.      
    Unauthorized demonstrations indeed cropped up and in
early October a royal decree introduced new amendments
to the Penal Code, especially in articles relating to press
violations.  Henceforward,  these  would  entail  harsh
penalties, including imprisonment.  Official spokespersons
explained  that  the  new  measures  were  aimed  against
some  weeklies  that  published  fabricated  news  that
harmed public morale and affected the image of Jordan
abroad. 
The  amendments  contained  a  new  and  more  detailed
definition  of  terrorism.   In  previous  laws  terrorism  was
defined as all  acts that create panic through the use of
explosives,  poisons,  or  other  substance  likely  to  cause
public danger. The new definition covered, inter alia,  ‘the
use of  violence or  the threat  to  use it  regardless of  its
motives or goals, carried out individually or by a group and
whose  objective  is  to  cause  disorder  or  jeopardize  the
safety  and security of society...’.
  As  the  severity  of  these  measures  implies,  the
government made good use of the opportunities offered
by the post September 11  atmosphere. 
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Yet the immediate and direct outcome of the September
11 events was the king’s decision to postpone the general
elections (due in November 2001) for an unspecified  time.
The  official  pretext  was  that  the  preparation  for  the
elections accorded with  the  new law. The government
needed  enough  time  to  set  the  logistical  and
administrative stage so as to ensure  ‘fair and transparent
polls’4.  In  reality  however  the  government  was
apprehensive  of  the  outcome  of  the  forthcoming
elections. The prevailing atmosphere and the strong pro-
Islamic,  anti-American  and  anti-Israeli  feelings  could
reflect  also  on the  attitude to  government.  Any election
campaign held in the shadow of the American attacks on
Afghanistan  and  under  the  impression  of  the  Intifada
which had just entered its second year,  might present  a
landslide  victory  to  anti-governmental  candidates  and
result  in  an  overwhelmingly  critical  and  oppositional
parliament.
As  the  political  vacuum continued,  in  the  absence of  a
parliament public  criticism of  the government  increased.
The  introduction  of  so  many  temporary  laws,  some  of
them seen as harming Jordan’s democratic  process,  as
well  as  the  passage  of  the  state’s  budget  without  any
parliamentary  debate,  expanded  criticism   beyond  the
traditional  opposition circles. Former ministers and even
prime ministers said  it was ‘regrettable that so many laws
of such quality and quantity  are being endorsed by the
government’. 
In  view of  those reactions,  King Abdallah instructed the
new government formed in early 2002 to prepare for the
new  elections  set  for  September  that  year.  Thereafter
intensive preparations  for the forthcoming election were
made  by  government  and  opposition  alike.  The
4 The Jordanian constitution allows postponement of parliamentary elections for a period not
exceeding two years 
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government issued new ID cards and only their  holders
could take vote in the elections5. Individual candidates and
political  parties  entered  into  intensive  negotiations.  The
opposition groups preparations were twofold. On the one
hand they still  hoped to force the government to amend
the ‘one man one-vote’ clause. The IAF bodies renewed
their  petition  against  the  election  law  to  the  high  court
claiming it  was unjust.  On the other hand they realized
that the government remained adamant in its adherence
to the above clause. After a short deliberation on whether
to  boycott  the  elections  as  in  1997,  they  decided  to
participate  and  began   to  organize  coalitions  and
gatherings  for  that  purpose6.  In  the  first  half  of  2002
Jordan seemed to be in an election fever, and it became
the main topic to preoccupy the public and the media.  
The government reiterated time and again its intention to
hold the elections  on time as promised, and it rejected
rumours of another possible postponement. From late May
however  the  official  government  position  was  that
elections were due ‘in the last quarter of  the year’ (i.e.,
between  October  and  December  2002)  unless
exceptional  developments  occurred   in  the  Palestinian
and/or the Iraqi arena. That statement indicated a twofold
change  in  the  government  position:  not  only  it  was
possible that the elections would be postponed again, that
postponement  was  now  attributed  to  regional
developments  while  hitherto  such  a  possibility  was
explained by domestic constraints only.    
Public criticism for the government’s reluctance to set a
final date for the elections mounted and spread.  The well
known  economist  and  columnist  Dr.  Fahed  Fanek
maintained in an article published in August that the delay
5 A new ‘Civil Status Law’ obliged  every person aged 18 years and older to possess an ID,
offenders could be  fined up to  JD100. 
6 The two most  salient  groups were  the Opposition Parties Higher Coordination Council
which consisted of 14 parties,  and  the National Council for Coordination among Political
Parties, with five parties.  
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in holding elections on time harmed Jordan’s democratic
image abroad. He quoted the warning from the American
journalist  Thomas  Friedman  that  while  it  might  take  a
country  like  Jordan  years  to  earn  a  good  reputation  it
could lose it in a single day. Fanek also indicated that the
political vacuum created by the absence of the parliament
could only be filled by ‘professional   associations, party
rallies and political salons. No one wanted that’. He also
criticized  those  who  advised  the  decision-makers   that
holding  general elections in the current climate would be
dangerous. ‘If we continue waiting to see what happens in
Palestine and Iraq, then we could end up being deprived
of  the  parliamentary  life  we  have  known  since  the
Kingdom was founded’.   
Three  days  after  the  publication  of  that  article  King
Abdallah announced that the elections were to be held in
the spring of 2003.
The king said that in 2001 the elections were postponed
on the first place ‘until a modern election law is finalised
and the necessary arrangements are in place to conduct
elections’.  When this was settled,   the difficult   regional
circumstances   dictated  another  postponement.  ‘..Our
wish for these elections to be free and fair and unaffected
by  regional  influences  and  circumstances,  left  us  no
choice but to postpone them’.   
The king’s announcement was accepted with criticism as
well as  skepticism. The major opposition party, the IAF,
called  the  king’s  decision  ‘unconstitutional’    and
commentators  pointed  out  that  if  the  elections  were
postponed  due  the  regional  situation  they  might  be
postponed  yet  again  as  no  one  could  tell  what  the
situation in the region would be  next spring. 
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Despite previous experience one may speculate that it is
likely  that  the  elections  will  indeed  take  place  in  the
coming spring. The king’s credibility will be at stake as well
as  the  international  image  of  Jordan  and  whole
democratization process. One has to bear in mind that no
general elections have been held since Abdallah came to
the throne.  It is unlikely that he is ready to deliberately
retreat  from   a  move  set  in  motion  by  his  late  father.
Moreover, elections in April or May 2003 are still within the
two-year  postponement  that  the  constitution  allows.
Stalling another time might be considered a gross violation
of the constitution. 
 
When negotiating opposition activity its seems  that  the
government  focused  its  efforts  on  the  media  as  if  it
regarded  written  criticism  as  more  dangerous  to  the
regime  than  demonstrations  and  other  tangible  acts  of
protest. 
Indeed the government also competed with the challenge
of the ‘traditional’  opposition;   professional associations
and the various Islamic and pan-Arabic factions and their
political  parties.    Besides  their  struggle  with  the
government over the election law, they organized and led
anti-Israeli  and  anti-American  activities.  The  latter  were
been  somewhat  intensified  in  early  2002  when  it  was
learned that among the al-Qa’ida suspects extradited  by
the Afghans to the US and  transferred to the Guantanano
Bay Camp there were about 70 Jordanian nationals. The
total  number  of  Jordanians  extradited  to  the  US  by
Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  was  184.  Human  rights
organizations  in  Jordan  denounced  their   incarceration
and asked the government to intervene on their behalf. 
The  opposition  groups’  anti-Israeli  activity  intensified
throughout the first half of 2002 particularly after Israel’s
incursion to the PA’s controlled territories and the siege of
Arafat’s HQ in Ramallah and of the Church of the Nativity
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in  Bethlehem.  They  focused  their  activity  against  any
manifestation of normalization with Israel and criticized the
government for not allowing mass anti-normalization and
anti-Israel  demonstrations.  In  January  the  government
detained  seven  members  of  the  anti-normalization
committee and in July a national day to fight normalization
declared by the professional associations was disallowed
by the government.
Nevertheless,  as  noted,  the  government’s  main  post
September 11 efforts to enforce compliance concentrated
on the Press.   
To  tighten  government  control  of  the  media  a  Higher
Media  Council  was  formed  in  December  2001,   whose
defined mission was to draw up, revise and assess the
policy of the print and audio visual media in Jordan. It had
the  authority  to  propose  procedures  and  regulations  to
organize  the media. The 11-member council was headed
by former Foreign Minister Kamal Abu Jabir and consisted
of editors, journalists, media experts and former ministers.
Originally  it  was  designed  to  replace  the  Ministry  of
Information  which  was  slated  to  be  abolished,  but  still
functioned.   The Prime Minister made it  clear what his
government  expected from the  Council,  stating  that  the
Council  ‘will  not  seek  to  amend  the  latest  media
restrictions introduced in the Penal Code’ .  The Council’s
chairperson admitted that its major dilemma was ‘how to
strike a balance between press freedom and responsible
journalism’.  It  seems that  Abu Jabir  failed to  bridge the
gap between the two. He resigned in July in protest at the
government’s  foot-dragging regarding  several  draft  laws
that the Council formulated and introduced7. 
 In  the  meantime  the  government  enforced  the  above
mentioned  Penal  Code  rather  intensively.  Between
7 At the time of writing (September 2002) no other chairperson has been appointed and the
activities of the Council have been practically frozen.
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January and August 2000 nearly ten people were detained
for violating the press law by publishing ‘false information’
or ‘offensive material’. They included  publishers, editors,
and journalists. Most of them were released  after a few
days.  In  most  cases  charges  were  not  pressed  and  it
seemed that these moves were designed merely to ‘warn’
the recalcitrant journalists rather than to punish them. All
the  steps  were  taken  against  members  of  the  written
media,  which  were  largely  administered  by  the  private
sector (mostly Palestinian). No one of the detainees  came
from the audio and visual sections of the media which are
completely controlled  by the government. 
The most salient  act  against  an alleged violation of  the
press law was the arrest in March 2002  of Tujoun Feisal,
a former deputy of Circassian origin (and the first woman
in Jordan to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies). She
was  accused  of  making  statements  that  harmed
Jordan’s reputation and image   and defamed  its people.
Feisal had been given an interview to Al-Jazira TV network
in which she claimed that the state’s judicial system was
unjust.  She  had  also  published  an  article  on  the  Web
accusing the Prime Minister of personal gains  from the
government’s decision to double the car insurance rate in
Jordan.  She  was  tried  and  sentenced  to  18  months
imprisonment.  However  in  July  she  was   released   by
special order of the king.
Conclusion
Between 1989 and 1999 Jordan underwent a rapid and
intensive process of democratization (probably one of the
most intensive ones  ever to take place in an Arab-Muslim
country); on the face of it,  it seemed irreversible. As from
1999 however the process was somewhat slowed down,
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out of the government’s fear that the continuation of the
process might pose a threat to the  regime’s   authority. 
The ‘retreat from democratization’ therefore did not start
on  September  11.  The day’s  events  however  gave it  a
certain  renewed  momentum.  King  Abdallah  and  his
government endeavoured to take advantage of the post-
September 11 atmosphere as a pretext to adopt certain
moves against  opposition forces and   to strengthen their
position. Yet, those events and their offshoots -  the war in
Afghanistan, the threats against Iraq and the Palestinian
Intifada  (the attitude towards which was also influenced
by  September  11)   in  the  background,  all  made  the
government  measures  counterproductive.   With  no
parliament  and  no  general  elections  in  the  near  future,
with  ample  temporary  laws,  passed  arbitrarily  by  the
government  and  powerfully  enforced,  the  process  of
‘retreat from democratization’ may soon reach a point of
no-return or at least become very difficult to reverse. 
The coming months are likely to be crucial for Jordan. The
moment of truth is approaching King Abdallah will have to
make  up  his  mind  whether  to  be  or  not  to  be  a
democratizing monarch.         
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